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A method for predicting Replacement Air Wing Carrier
Qualification grades is examined. The data were supplied
by Fighter Squadron One-Twenty-One, and subjected to multiple
regression analyses in search of important variables that
may be used in the prediction. Such have been identified
and applied to the data. The results are extremely
encouraging and a follow on study applied to a broader data
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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the distinguishing characteristic of a
Naval Aviator has been his ability to land a high performance
aircraft on the deck of an aircraft carrier at sea. This is
not only a proud trademark, but is considered by many to be
the real mark of success and professionalism for pilots,
for v/hile many individuals have learned to fly quite
competently, relatively few ever master the intricacies of
carrier landing techniques. In large measure, then, if we
are able to predict a pilots chance of success in mastering
the carrier landing game, we will have predicted to a great
extent his value to a squadron, and to the Navy. There can
be no doubt, and we will examine some statistics to show
this, if we are able to predict a lack of success at the ship
we can save vast amounts of money, time, and most important
lives
.
The particular problem addressed here came to light
during a tour as the senior landing signal officer for the
Pacific Fleet F-4 replacement training squadron, Fighter
Squadron One-Twenty-One, (VF-121) . Due to stringent limita-
tions on time, aircraft, and carrier availability it became
mandatory to try to pinpoint those individuals who would
ultimately have a significant amount of difficulty during
carrier qualifications very early in their training in order

to devote extra time and attention where it was available,
in hopes of ensuring their ultimate success. It was felt,
largely on the basis of experience, that instrument training
grades in the Advanced Training Command, and in the Replace-
ment Air Wing's instrument training squadron, were the
strongest possible indicators of potential success or failure,
but these predictions were based only on an intuitive "feel"
for the situation. This project was started in order to
attempt to provide some statistical support for these theories,
or to debunk them thoroughly should that prove the case.' In
the event they proved successful, the object was to provide
some formulation which would permit accurate predictions of
carrier qualification performance, utilizing any factors
which might be available in normal circumstances.

II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AND APPROACHES TAKEN
On completion of the Flight Training Command, the newly-
designated aviator (nugget) proceeds to one of the Combat
Replacement Air Wings, accompanied by a relatively small
and incomplete sample of his performance during training.
The following specific scores, or grades, are forwarded:
1. Basic Training Command Standard Score
2. Advanced Training Command Standard Score
3. Ground School Standard Score












It must be recognized that a sizeable investment has been
made in the individual pilot to this point, a subject of
considerable study in itself. In a paper written for the

Naval Personnel Research and Development Laboratory in May
of 1970, Joseph Taylor and Simon Arzigian break down the cost
for an F-4 pilot as follows:
Naval Aviation Schools Command $ 2,140.00
Primary / Basic Training $ 3,195.00
Advanced Training $123,848.00
Total $129,183.00
The same reference contains similar figures for pilots trained
in other aircraft types, although these figures are basically
constant across the board. The aviator has received 14 to
18 months of intensive training to prepare him to step into
a combat aircraft. In the next 9 to 180 days, the first
year and a half he has spent in the Naval Aviation business
will be made to look like grammar school, as he compares it
to the postgraduate school of Naval Aviation, the "RAG". Hare
he will receive an intensive course designed to make him a
combat ready fleet pilot, a course that culminates in Carrier
Qualification in his particular aircraft, and which will
cost the Navy another $163,776.00, in the case of the F-4
pilot. It should be apparent from these figures, that the
ability to predict carrier qualification performance early
in the game would pay off, not only in pinpointing specific
individuals as being marginal, but can, if done early enough
and with high enough accuracy, save a substantial sum of
money by merely eliminating those individuals who are doomed
to failure from the start.

There have been numerous attempts at finding correlations
which might prove useful, perhaps one of the more interesting
is contained in a paper written for the Naval Aerospace
Medical Research Laboratory, Pensacola, Florida, by Lieutenant
George M. F.ickus Jr. Medical Services Corps, United States
Naval Reserve. Lt . Rickus reported on a survey of flight
surgeons conducted over a two year period. The flight
surgeons were asked to identify and classify unsatisfactory
aviators. The classifications were delineated and the
flight surgeons identified 14 4 such aviators. The following
breakdown resulted:
24 Men other pilots refused to fly with
43 Turned in their wings
32 Had their wings removed by board action
22 Were transferred administratively
23 Were given non flying duties
A control group of 146 aviators were also identified,
these men were characterized as the "better" aviators in
their respective squadrons. (Apparently Lt. Rickus had
planned on using non-parametric methods, he does not so state,
however, and the reason for this particular control group
is never made clear in his paper.)
Lt. Rickus states, "A comparison of the available
training statistics on the two groups indicated significant
differences in three areas:

1. Peer rating
2. Basic Carrier Qualification
3. Advanced Flight Grade "
It is significant that two of the three areas found signifi-
cant in this study are areas which are not forwarded to the
Replacement Air Wing unless specifically requested, these
are the Peer rating, and Basic Carrier Qualification scores.
The table which follows is presented as part of Lt.
Rickus report. It provides a breakdown and cumulative
frequency distribution of the 99 aviators from the above
group for whom full training statistics exist, compared to
87 3 so called "satisfactory" aviators who had comparable
statistics available.










Less than 2 .70 9 1 5 5
2.71-2.75 1 1 6
2.76-2.80 1 4 10
2.81-2.85 36 5 10 20
2.86-2.90 36 9 8 28
2.91-2.95 81 19 14 42
2.96-3.00 81 28 30 73
3.01-3.05 387 72 10 83
3.06-3.10 126 87 5 88
3.11-3.15 72 95 6 94
3.16 or greater 43 100 6 100

Although the explanation of the table as it is contained in
Lt. Rickus paper is incomplete at best it appears to point
to the following conclusions
:
1. By establishing a Basic Carrier Qualification grade
of 2.80 it will be possible to eliminate 10% of the
unsatisfactory aviators, while causing an attrition of
only 1% among the satisfactory group.
2. By increasing the cutoff score to 2.90 we eliminate
28% of the unsatisfactory aviators, while forcing a 9%
loss in the satisfactory ranks.
3. A further increase to 2.95 causes an attrition of
42% of the unsatisfactory group, while losing only 19%
of the satisfactory group.
The term cutoff refers to simply terminating training for
those individuals who fall below that grade point average for
the stage involved.
Unfortunately Lt . Rickus has not identified his groups
well enough to allow us to accept these conclusions at face
value, in fact he presents no conclusions at all, merely
offering the table as shown and allowing the reader to draw
his own conclusions. It would be nice to be able to assume
that the sample is a complete cross section of the fleet
during the time that the study was undertaken, and that the
conclusions we have drawn therefore hold true across the
board in Naval Aviation. Since that issue is not addressed
throughout the paper, further research is called for. If that
assumption holds true the implication would be obvious,
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particularly in the light of the cost figures quoted earlier.
The optimum policy would simply be, maintain a very high
grade cutoff point for Basic Carrier Qualifications, and
allow only limited access to the Advanced Training Command.
The end product should improve markedly, and the cost per copy
should decrease. Even without further research this appears
to be an acceptable method for obtaining a high quality
product, the decision being one of understanding and accepting
the tradeoff.
Another study, under the auspices of the same group,
dated 2 March 1970, indicates a strong relationship between
basic carrier qualification, and Advanced Training in the jet
community, but little success in correlating Basic CQ with
performance in the Combat Replacement Air Wing. The study
indicates a very small correlation between Basic CQ and
advanced multi-engine training, but it is felt that the results
of the first study referenced, if they may be accepted, and
the small additional cost of Basic CQ training for this
category of pilots, provides a strong argument for allowing
all fixed wing pilots to complete Basic CQ training, and use
the results as a very definite attrition point.
It will be our purpose now to branch and look specifically
at the jet community, and more particularly the F-4 pilots




As has been stated, it is apparent that we should attempt
to identify, as early as possible, those individuals who
will fall in a marginal or unsatisfactory category during
shipboard operations. Clearly, if the unsatisfactory
individual can be identified, there is but one course of
action, immediate forced attrition. In the case of the
marginal individual some special attention may be sufficient
to save the situation, and the money already invested.
Towards this end a study of the "nugget" Naval Aviators who
completed the West Coast F-4 Combat Replacement Air Wing,
during a two year period, has been completed. The purpose
of the study was to determine whether it was possible to
predict performance on Carrier Qualifications within
acceptable limits of accuracy.
The most frustrating part of the study was the collection
of data. The proposed method of attack required a complete
stage breakdown from the commencement of the Basic Training
Command on through to eventually joining a fleet squadron.
In addition it would be necessary for the sample size to be
large enough to be satistically significant. It rapidly
became apparent that, while various places maintain summaries
and frequently standard scores, no one, easily accessible,
location had the breakdown required. The single most helpful
item was the fact that VF-121 at the Naval Air Station,
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Miramar, California, maintained a file of training jackets
covering several years, containing not only a stage by stage
breakdown of training in the F-4, but, in addition, containing
grades from the instrument refresher squadron, VF-126, and
the list of grades alluded to earlier in this paper.
It is appropriate to comment at this point that an
examination of grading statistics from the Basic and Advanced
Training Commands show a very small standard deviation from
the mean score for each stage, indicating a high degree of
standardization in both instructional and grading techniques.
For the sample examined the mean stage grades and associated
standard deviations are given:
Mean Std. Dev.
a. Familiarization 3.06117 0.07527
b. Basic Instruments 3.08512 0.05305
c. Instrument Nav. 3.03888 0.04591
d. Advanced Fam. 3.02619 0.08597
e. Form. & Tact. 3.06449 0.04441
f. Night Fam. 3.06095 0.04801
g. Operational Nav. 3.08283 0.05723
h. Air-to-Ground 3.07762 0.07317
i. Tactics 3.08429 0.05799
j. Air-to-Air 3.05198 0.05030
k. C.Q. 3.01055 0.06623
Only those individuals who had never been carrier
qualified in a fleet operational aircraft were considered in
the sample. Complete statistics were available on 158 such
13

individuals, of these 8 were known to have had major difficulty-
landing aboard ship after joining their squadron, and had
been removed from flying status either voluntarily, or through
evaluation board action. It is interesting that no aviators
were given evaluation boards for performance during Carrier
Qualificati.ons during this period, although several had beer
recommended by the Landing Signal Officers involved. Of the
8 individuals noted above, all had Carrier Qualification
grades between 2.00 and 2.58 while in VF-121. Two other
individuals fell within that same grade category, but in
both cases they had gone on to do an acceptable job in the
squadron. The mean score for Carrier Qualification in VF-121
for the entire sample was 2.8186 8, and the standard deviation
was 0.23700.
On the basis of the records noted, the fact that 2.58 is
almost exactly one standard deviation below the mean, and a
certain amount of intuitive appeal, it was decided to try
establishing 2.58 as a cutoff score. Any predicted Carrier
Qualification grade below 2.58 constitutes justification for
discontinuing training. To lend statistical credence to the
hypothesis that 2.58 is a reasonable cutoff point, a discrim-
inant analysis was performed using the UCLA Health Sciences
Computing Facility BIMED program. The F test performed on
the data reveals a significant difference in the two groups
when using 2.58 as the cutoff point, significant to any level
tabled in standard references, or at least the .999 level.
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Two standard IBM package programs were then applied to
the data, STEPR, and REGRE . STEPR takes the individual
independent variables in a regression analysis, determines
which order they should enter in, and enters them. REGRE
takes the variables and enters them in the order instructed
by the user. The use of the computer at this point was
obvious and necessary. While the computations are not at all
difficult, they are extremely time consuming when the number
of possible combinations of independent variables is taken
into consideration. (15 independent variables were checked)
The computer permitted a rapid survey of all variables to
determine correlation with the dependent variable (C.Q. score)
,
and was able to perform rapidly the computations using many
different combinations of variables in a search for the
strongest possible predictors.
As suspected, the most powerful predictor was one of the
instrument grades. It was not, however, one of the Advanced
Training Command grades as had been expected. The Instrument
Refresher Squadron, VF-126, had the strongest positive
correlation (.556). There are a number of potential explana-
tions for this, none of which have anything more than
intuition to support them as theories. The most appealing is,
the newly designated aviator has been out of the cockpit for
six to eight weeks while he has been on leave and in transit
from his last duty station. When he climbs into the plane
for the 10 flights in the Instrument Refresher syllabus he is
not as sharp as he might be, and in fact often has a good deal
15

of apprehension about it. The tension generated, coupled
with the fact that he is in a foreign atmosphere for the
first time in weeks tends to simulate quite well the mental
and physical strains he will encounter at the ship when he
goes out for the first time. In addition the instrument
skills he will be called on to use are exactly those he will
be called upon to use a great deal in shipboard operations.
Although it is not possible to quote any authority as
justification for these conclusions, they seem further
supported when the second and third best predictors arejfound
to be the Fam stage in the Advanced Training Command, and the
Fam stage in the fleet aircraft itself. In each case similar
tensions are readily apparent. It would be possible to go
down the list of correlations, but that hardly seems bene-
ficial in this case, we should note in passing, however, that
there are two stages with pronounced negative correlation
with Carrier Qualifications, they are Formation and Tactics,
and Air-to-Air.
Once the correlation coefficients had been obtained,
linear regression methods were employed in an attempt to
predict performance not only reliably, but as early as possible
as well. Once again the computer became an invaluable tool,
for the method employed had to be largely trial and error. It
was found that the highest accuracy could be obtained by
permitting the pilot to complete the Familiarization, and
Instrument Training stages within the F-4 squadron, however at
that point a sizeable amount of ground school training, and
16

some 10-15 hours of flight time has been devoted to the
individual pilot, a significant amount of the training funds
have already been committed. An att.empt was therefore made
to back off and make the prediction as early as possible
without a significant reduction in accuracy. The limit, with
the data currently available, seems to be the completion of
the Instrument Refresher Squadron, the following formula is
appropriate
:
Predicted C.Q. = -1.64886 + 0.78344 (a) + 0.71096 (b)
where (a) = Instrument Refresher Squadron Grade
(b) = Familiarization Stage grade from Advanced
Training Command.
The standard error of estimate achieved using this formula




IV . RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
In no case did the formula predict that any individual
who was ultimately successful in the fleet would fall below
the cutoff point of 2.58, that was true even in the case of
the two pilots who had low Carrier Qualification grades, but.
had done an acceptable job in a fleet squadron. All of the
8 individuals who had eventually proven unacceptable were
pinpointed by the formula. Closer inspection of the
individual scores involved revealed that the two who were not
predicted to have problems had mean scores in the two
significant areas as shown:
a. Instrument Refresher 2.88
b. Fam. Stage 3.00
On the other hand the 8 pinpointed by the formula had:
a. Instrument Refresher 2.35
b. Fam. Stage 3.06
Note that the Instrument Refresher grade was higher for the
two aviators not identified by the prediction equation, whereas
the Fam. stage grade was lower. This might appear as a
discrepancy because both of these variables are positively
correlated with the Carrier Qualification forecast. Closer
examination reveals that the above two Instrument Refresher
grades are more than four standard deviations apart (n.b.
standard deviation for this stage is .13363) whereas the Fam.
18

stage grades differ by less than one standard deviation (Fam.
stage standard deviation is .07527). Thus, in the particular
cases examined the spread in the one variable overwhelms the
small (reversed) spread in the other. This phenomena is not
at all unusual in the application of regression analysis.
Claims of 100% accuracy are at best unwise, and often
refutable, but the evidence does seem to support a much more
detailed analysis of a broader group of data, particularly
since all estimates generated by using this formula erred on
the high, or safe, side. There are several areas which will
require financial and administrative support not obtainable
at this time.
The results reported on are on]y valid in the case of
Fighter Squadron One-Twenty-One, and may not be applied across
the board without further investigation. Additionally the
results available to this point would have value only to the
Commanding Officer of the Fleet Replacement Training Squadrons
and not to the Bureau of Naval Personnel. These problem areas
may both be dealt with simply by providing adequate support,
in the form of the required grading statistics for the most
part, to enable the area to be more thoroughly researched.
This must include a complete stage breakdown from the time the
subjects enter the Training Command, until joining a fleet
squadron, and must constitute a statistically significant
sample for each of the separate aviation communities by air-
craft type. It is felt that this paper clearly demonstrates
19

a substantial potential for significant long term gains
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